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Across Europe, CO2 emission permits represent one of the main policy instruments to comply with the 
limits established by the European Commission to achieve the goals of the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper 
we use microdata to address two issues regarding the impact of the European Carbon Market (EU ETS). 
On the one hand, we analyse the sectoral effects of the EU ETS in Portugal. The main goal is to study the 
outcomes of this policy in terms of the transactions carried out between sectors, as well as the distributive 
consequences. On the other hand, we also look at the regional impact. The pre-existing specialization of 
different regions in the production of different goods and services might lead to an uneven economic 
impact of the new permit market. In particular, Portuguese data indicate a distribution of revenue from low 
income to high income regions, or rather, between installations located in those regions. We focus on the 
first two years of operation of the EU ETS, using data for each one of the 244 Portuguese installations 
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In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, the European Union has pledged to reduce the 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was 
established to that effect by Directive 2003/87/CE. An emission permit system is a pollution-control 
instrument based on requiring pollution sources to hold transferable permits. The regulator issues the 
desired number of permits and each source designs its own compliance strategy, including sale or 
purchase of allowances and pollution abatement. The incentives created by this system ensure that each 
source has enough flexibility to minimize its compliance costs and, as a consequence, the policymaker’s 
environmental goals are achieved cost-effectively, i.e. at the lowest possible cost for the whole economy.  
 
In spite of the desirable theoretical properties of emission permit schemes, the nature of the EU ETS 
raises a few efficiency and equity concerns. Cost-effectiveness of any environmental regulation requires a 
full coverage of emitters, especially when non-subject sectors present lower abatement costs (see 
Böhringer et al, 2006). Also, any unequal treatment of sectors generates distributional consequences. For 
instance, Kettner et al (2008) provide evidence that Phase I allocations favoured large installations relative 
to smaller ones. In defence of the EU ETS design, a market limited to main emitters is appealing due to a 
reduction of administrative and compliance costs. Furthermore, there is no evidence of market power, 
which if it existed would diminish trading efficiency (Convery and Redmond, 2007).
1  
 
Another problem is associated with the free allocation of pollution permits by most governments, despite 
the empirical evidence on the superiority of auctioning. Cramton and Kerr (2002) note that auctioning 
“allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives 
for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.” This 
is in line with the conclusions of the literature on revenue recycling through distortionary tax reduction 
(Parry et al. 1999; Fullerton and Metcalf 2001). Environmental instruments aim to correct pre-existing 
market distortions. Therefore, when they are used to raise revenue (such as with environmental taxes or 
auctioned permits), other taxes which carry deadweight losses (such as labour or income taxes) can be 
reduced. This type of “green” fiscal reform could thus allow a reduction of the total tax burden in the 
economy.  
 
A final point is that regulation falls on installations that in turn are anchored in a physical territory. The 
specialization of the different regions in the production of different goods and services can lead to different 
economic impacts of the carbon market from a regional point of view. If there is no proportionality between 
the regional share of affected installations and population, value added or employment, we can expect 
important distributional effects between regions, in Europe and even within countries. 
 
Regulations minimising distributive and economic efficiency distortions are necessary. Hence it is 
important to study both the sectoral and regional impact of the EU ETS inside the different countries 
involved. However, little attention has been paid to the later in the literature
2. This article focuses on the 
Portuguese case, analysing both regional and sectoral EU ETS economic impacts. To this end we use 
data from 2005 and 2006 for 244 Portuguese installations covered by the EU ETS as well as economic 
                                                 
1 For a more complete discussion, Convery (2009) reviews the literature on emissions trading in Europe. 
2 The only exception we are familiar with is for the case of Spain (Rodriguez and del Rio, 2008). Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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data from the “Sistema Anual de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) database
3. The regions are shown according 
to the European NUTS III classification, consisting of 28 regions in continental Portugal and the 
Autonomous Regions of Madeira and Azores.  
 
The data reveal that: (i) Portuguese carbon emissions permits are extremely concentrated in a small 
number of installations; (ii) the thermoelectric sector was the only one that had a negative balance, and 
only in 2005, mainly due to adverse weather conditions; (iii) other sectors appear to have benefited from 
EU ETS participation, some significantly so; iv) a limited number of regions show a high concentration of 
regulated emissions, surpluses and deficits. Those results, together with the fact that about 60% of the 
national emissions remain unregulated by the EU ETS, highlight the necessity of considering the full 
distributive impacts when analysing policy measures.  
 
The article is made up of seven sections, including this introduction. Section 2 describes the European 
Union’s Emission Trading System, whereas Section 3 focuses on the first Portuguese National Allocation 
Plan (NAP). Section 4 analyzes the sectoral effects of the European Carbon Market in Portugal, whereas 
Section 5 discusses its regional effects. The Portuguese NAP for the second period, 2008-2012, is 
described in Section 6. Finally, some policy implications and the main conclusions are set out in Sections 7 
and 8, respectively.  
 
 
2. The European Union Emission Trading System 
 
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was established to that effect by Directive 
2003/87/CE. It is based on six fundamental principles: i) it is a “cap-and-trade” system (an overall cap is 
set, defining the maximum amount of emissions, and sources can buy or sell allowances on the open 
market at European level); ii) it is focused on CO2 from large industrial emitters; iii) implementation is 
taking place in two phases (2005-2007 and 2008-2012) with periodic reviews; iv) emission allowances are 
decided within national allocation plans; v) it includes a strong compliance framework; vi) the market is EU-
wide but taps emission reduction opportunities in the rest of the world through the use of the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, and it also provides for links with compatible systems 
in third countries. 
 
The installations covered by the EU ETS initially received allowances for free from each EU Member 
State’s government, in what is known as “grandfathering”. However, since unused permits
4 can be sold, 
installations are stimulated to invest in emissions reduction even when they are under their “cap” (the 
grandfathered allocated permits).  
 
Until now, each Member State was able to decide the sum of permits to attribute to the installations 
regulated by the Directive, following criteria provided by the European Commission. In the two initial 
phases, a limited number of sectors was included: energy activities (combustion, refineries, coke ovens); 
iron and steel (production and processing); mineral industries (cement, glass, ceramic products); and pulp 
                                                 
3 Although 2007 data is available, we do not generally provide it in our analysis because the market collapsed and 
monetary values were consequently much lower. We do, however, use it occasionally to give a richer picture of 
developments in Phase I. Moreover, a preliminary analysis of available 2008 data is done in section 5.  
4 Carbon permits in the EU ETS are named European Union Allowances (EUA) and each covers one ton of carbon. 
Henceforth in the paper we will use the word “permit” when referring to EUA. Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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and paper. It should be noted that the emissions of the installations covered by the market represent 
approximately 40% of the total CO2 EU emissions.  
 
In April 2009, the new energy-climate package was approved
5. This includes a revision of the EU ETS 
(Directive 2009/29/EC) which contemplates: (i) an EU-wide target for GHG industrial emissions to achieve 
a 21% decrease in 2020 compared to 2005 emissions
6; (ii) an extension of the EU ETS to include two 
other GHG, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons, and to cover other sectors, namely aviation and the 
petrochemical, ammonia and aluminium sectors; (iii) a greater share (above 50 %) of auctioned permits
7; 
(iv) an opt-out possibility for small installations, emitting below 25,000 ton CO2/year, which show 
alternative reduction measures. These changes will enter into force in January 2013. The package also 
contains other provisions, such as national binding targets for renewable-energy use and for non-ETS 
sectors, in order to reach, respectively, a share of renewables in final energy demand of 20% and an 
average reduction of 10% in these sectors’ GHG emissions, by 2020. 
In the first year of trading, which was 2005, 362 Mt (million tonnes) of CO2 were traded on the market for a 
sum of €7.2 billion, as well as a large number of futures and options (Point Carbon (2006)). The price of 
allowances increased more or less steadily to its peak level, in April 2006, of about €30 per tonne CO2, but 
fell in May 2006 to under €10 on news that overall emission caps were so generous that in many countries 
there was no need to reduce emissions. The trading price collapsed to €1.2 in March 2007, declining 
further to €0.10 in September 2007. Verified emissions, on the other hand, grew in the first phase of the 
scheme, albeit by less than GDP. For the countries for which data is available (all 27 member states 
except Romania, Bulgaria and Malta), emissions increased by 1.9% between 2005 and 2007 (European 
Commission (2008b)). 
Phase I is widely believed to have been over-allocated. The number of allowances distributed to 
installations in 2005 exceeded those installations’ emissions by about 176 Mt or 7,7 % of the total EU cap 
(see Table 1). This could imply that few additional overall emission reductions have been achieved. 
However, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) emphasize that simply comparing emissions with the cap does not 
take into account abatement brought about by ETS participation. In their analysis, they compare actual 
emissions with business-as-usual scenarios to show that abatement might actually explain a significant 
part of the overall Phase I surplus. At any rate, caps for the second trading period have been lowered 
9,5% for the EU as a whole.  
Some of the EU15 member states had a net “short” position in 2005
8, notably Spain with the highest deficit 
(close to 5%). All the EU10 countries, on the other hand, were “long”, often significantly so as in the case 
of the Baltic countries. 
                                                 
5 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm 
6 And 30% compared to 1990 emissions (see European Commission (2007a)) 
7 Governments could auction up to 5% of allowances in phase I (2005-2007) and up to 10% in phase II (2008-2012). In 
phase I, only four out of 25 Member States used auctions at all, and in only one case were auctions fully employed to 
the 5% limit (see Hepburn et al (2006) and Ellerman and Buchner (2007)). 
8 Countries are said to be short (long) if they had emissions greater (smaller) than their allocation so that they are 
potential buyers (sellers) of allowances from (to) other countries, in order to achieve compliance. The same terminology 
can be used for sectors. Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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Table 1- Caps by Member State in 1
st and 2
nd period of EU ETS (quantities in Mt CO2) 
Member State  1
st period cap  2005 verified 
emissions 
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) 
 in %  
Cap allowed  
2008-2012 
Austria 33  33,4  -1,2%  30,7 
Belgium 62,1  55,58 10,5%  58,5 
Bulgaria 42,3  40,6  4,0%  42,3 
Cyprus 5,7  5,1  10,5%  5,48 
Czech Rep.  97,6  82,5  15,5%  86,8 
Denmark 33,5  26,5  20,9%  24,5 
Estonia 19  12,62  33,6%  12,72 
Finland 45,5  33,1 27,3%  37,6 
France 156,5  131,3  16,1%  132,8 
Germany 499  474  5,0%  453,1 
Greece 74,4  71,3 4,2%  69,1 
Hungary 31,3  26  16,9%  26,9 
Ireland 22,3  22,4  -0,4%  22,3 
Italy   223,1  225,5  -1,1%  195,8 
Latvia 4,6  2,9  37,0%  3,43 
Lithuania 12,3  6,6  46,3%  8,8 
Luxembourg 3,4  2,6  23,5%  2,5 
Malta 2,9  1,98  31,7%  2,1 
Netherlands 95,3  80,35  15,7%  85,8 
Poland 239,1  203,1  15,1%  208,5 
Portugal 38,9  36,4  6,4%  34,8 
Romania 74,8  70,8  5,3%  75,9 
Slovakia 30,5  25,2  17,4%  30,9 
Slovenia 8,8  8,7  1,1%  8,3 
Spain 174,4  182,9  -4,9%  152,3 
Sweden 22,9  19,3 15,7%  22,8 
UK 245,3  242,4  1,2%  246,2 
Total  2298,5 2122,16  7,7%  2080,93 
Source: European Commission (2007b); Additional information on which installations are included is given in the source. 
Ellerman and Buchner (2007) discuss the disparities among countries for 2005, presenting the gross 
positions for each one as well as the net ones. They note that the member states which comprise a large 
part of the potential demand are also important suppliers, indicating that many trades were among 
installations within each country. They also provide a brief sectoral analysis. It is clear that for the EU as a 
whole, the Power & Heat sector was the only one to have a short position, while the other industrial 
sectors were all long, often by large percentages (around 20% for Ceramic, Iron, Steel & Coke, and Pulp & 
Paper). The underlying reasons for this uneven distribution of permits among sectors appear to have been 
that other sectors face competition with firms outside the EU and also that abatement options were 
cheaper in the power sector. As a result, the National Allocation Plans were generous in the number of 
permits allocated except for the Power & Heat sector. Unsurprisingly, the power sector, which makes up 
around 60% of EU ETS emissions, represented in 2005 nearly 90% of potential permit demand. It also 
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2.1 The first Portuguese National Allocation Plan 
 
The target established by the Directive for Portugal is that during the Kyoto compliance period, 2008-2012, 
the mean emissions cannot exceed a 27% increase over the emission levels of 1990. Figure 1 illustrates 
the actual evolution of emissions until 2007 and the linear path to achieving the target in 2010, excluding 
land use change and forestry (LULUCF). A reference scenario produced in 2006 placed Portugal 12% 
above the attributed limit and proposed additional measures aimed at sectors that do not participate in the 
EU ETS, such as transportation, agriculture, commerce and households. The latest official estimates 
predict an annual deficit of only 5% (2.88 Mt CO2e), to be covered using the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms 
of flexibility.
9 Emissions show significant annual variability, mainly due to the fluctuations in hydroelectric 
power generation that are caused primarily by precipitation variability, as discussed in Section 3.  
 
Figure 1: Emissions and linear path to Kyoto target 
Source: Agência Portuguesa de Ambiente 
 
The first Portuguese National Allocation Plan (NAP), covering the period 2005-2007, considered 38,9 Mt of 
CO2 per year, of which 36,9 Mt for 244 industrial installations and the remainder left aside for new 
installations. Mostly, historical emissions were used to distribute permits between sectors and installations. 
Exceptions were made for new installations and for the sectors of electricity generation and iron and steel, 
where historical data was seen as inappropriate considering technological potential for emission reduction. 
Moreover, as in most other EU countries, benchmarking was not used (see Ellerman and Buchner, 2007).  
 
The actual distribution of permits among the 244 installations covered by the EU ETS was based 
specifically on two criteria: (i) the historical emissions of each one, which had previously been used for the 
definition of the total permits assigned to each sector and (ii) combustion emissions assuming an “average 
fuel” for each activity sector. Individual assignments were given out based on the sum of adjusted 
combustion emissions with historical emissions. Finally, this sum was multiplied by a factor of global 
adjustment (equivalent to that used for the calculation of the emissions for each sector).  
 
                                                 
9 See Comissão para as Alterações Climáticas (2009) Memorando – Estado de Cumprimento do Protocolo de Quioto, 
in http://www.cumprirquioto.pt/documents/List.action 
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An outstanding characteristic of the Portuguese NAP, as of many others, is the inclusion of a large number 
of small installations. Figure 2 ranks the 244 Portuguese installations according to their allocated 
emissions and reveals the extreme inequality of their size.  
 
Figure 2: Inequality in the distribution of emissions and allocated permits (2005) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets 
 
We can highlight from the permit allocation that 10% of installations have 90% of emissions permits. Also, 
two installations jointly have 31.5% of permits, and there are 163 installations classified as “mini” (less than 
25000 tons of CO2), which together account for less than 4% of emissions. Thus it is clear that Portuguese 
permits are extremely concentrated. This is similar to findings for all EU countries, where Kettner et al 
(2008) find that the biggest 1,8% of installations account for 50% of emissions. Naturally, regions where 
these are located will support a large percentage of emission reduction effort.  
 
 
3. Sectoral effects of the European Carbon Market in Portugal 
 
Based on the final reports of the EU ETS for the years 2005 and 2006, we can analyse the effort made by 
each sector to reduce CO2 emissions, and also identify sectors that were harmed by or benefited from the 
permit distribution. Recall that the Portuguese NAP attributed the equivalent of 36,9 Mt of CO2 for each 
year in the first period. In 2005 and 2006 Portuguese installations only emitted 36,4 and 33 Mt 
respectively, so the country had a surplus that provided potential revenues of approximately 10,4 M € and 
58,8 M € for all installations.
10 Table 2 shows the breakdown for the different sectors regulated by the EU 
ETS in 2005 and 2006. In order to assess the economic implications of the EU ETS, we assumed that the 
price of each permit negotiated by the Portuguese companies was 21,73 €/t and 15,14 €/t respectively in 
2005 and 2006
11. Negative values indicate potential profit from permit sales and not actual profit, as it 
unlikely that all surplus permits were actually sold. Moreover, even if all permits had been sold the net 
benefit of EU ETS participation would need to take into account transaction costs, which tend to be higher 
                                                 
10 The numbers for 2007 show a further drop in emissions, to 31,2 Mt CO2.  
11 These are the weighted average prices of permits traded by European companies, calculated from the monthly 
average prices and the monthly volume of rights (tons of CO2) interchanged in the European market, using the data in 
The European Carbon Market Monthly Bulletin published by Caissê des Dépôts 
(www.caissedesdepots.fr/missionclimat/).  Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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for smaller firms. Still, ETS data indicates that in the first transaction period less than 10% of Portuguese 
EUA expired worthless (Trotignon and Ellerman, 2008). 
 
Table 2 – Attributed permits, emissions (in Mt) and sectoral costs (in M€) for 2005 and 2006 
 
      
Possible expenses in 
permit purchase 
Sectors  Emissions 2005  Permits   Coverage %   at price 21,73€/ton 
Thermoelectric generation  21,91  20,97  95,7  20,50 
Ceramic 0,87  1,16  134,4  -6,47 
Cement and lime  6,98  7,14  102,2  -3,32 
Cogeneration 2,06  2,49  120,7  -9,26 
Other Combustion Facilities   0,42  0,54  126,3  -2,42 
Iron and steel  0,22  0,31  140,1  -1,92 
Pulp and paper  0,31  0,36  115,3  -1,05 
Refineries 3,01  3,27  108,5  -5,58 
Glass 0,64  0,68  106,4  -0,89 
Total 36,4  36,9  101,3  -10,40 
        
      
Possible expenses in 
permit purchase 
Sectors  Emissions 2006  Permits   Coverage %  at price 15,14 €/ton  
Thermoelectric generation  18,67  20,97  112,3  -34,85 
Ceramic 0,81  1,16  142,7  -5,24 
Cement and lime  6,86  7,14  104,0  -4,14 
Cogeneration 2,06  2,49  120,8  -6,49 
Other Combustion Facilities   0,39  0,53  135,2  -2,09 
Iron and steel  0,24  0,31  130,3  -1,09 
Pulp and paper  0,31  0,36  117,0  -0,80 
Refineries 3,02  3,27  108,2  -3,75 
Glass 0,64  0,67  104,0  -0,39 
Total 33,0  36,9  111,8  -58,82 
Source: Own elaboration using the data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets; totals for 2006 exclude 3 
installations which were removed, as there were problems with their emissions data 
 
Only thermoelectric plants have a negative balance in 2005, that is, they discharged more emissions than 
the permits allocated to them (approximately one million tons of CO2 in excess). The assigned permits in 
that year covered 95.7% of emissions made by this sector, mainly due to a drought that reduced 
hydroelectricity generation
12. In the remaining sectors there was a surplus of emission rights for both 
years, especially so for Ceramic, Iron and Steel, Other Combustion Facilities and Cogeneration. We 
provide some analysis on the significance for each sector of the extra revenues and costs below. 
 
One important advantage of microdata is that we can perform a detailed analysis of the potential outcome 
of the carbon market, with individual data for each installation. Figure 3 shows the wide discrepancies in 
the net positions held by different installations. Obviously, these discrepancies reflect the interaction 
between permit allocation, abatement activities, and general activity level. The right-hand tail in this figure, 
with positive 100% positions, refers to installations that had zero carbon emissions despite having positive 
permit allocations. On the other hand, those with negative 100% positions represent installations that had 
to cover double their initial allocations
13.  
                                                 
12 See section 3.1 for a detailed analysis of Thermoelectric generation sector. 
13 Each year had only one installation (not the same one) with a negative position lower than -100%. These were not 
included in the figure to minimize scale distortions. Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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Figure 3: Net position as  % of allocated permits in 2005 and 2006 (red line) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets 
 
In both 2005 and 2006 around 20% of installations were short and 80% long. Nonetheless, the figure 
shows that there was a slight shift to better positions in 2006. To assess the economic implications of 
these positions for each sector’s installations, we use the SABI database. This contains general 
information, as well as the financial accounts, for a large number of Iberian firms. We were able to get 
financial data for 80% of the EU ETS installations, representing approximately 60% of emissions. 
Unfortunately, the thermoelectric generation sector has the lowest level of coverage in SABI (34% of 
emissions). Even so, some interesting conclusions can be presented regarding the possible significance of 
EU ETS participation for financial accounts. We calculated the potential revenue from permit sales (or cost 
from permit purchases) for each installation, using average 2005 and 2006 prices as before, as a 
percentage of that installation’s operational revenues (or operational costs). The results are presented in 
Figure 4. Ceramic is shown separately as it contains a much larger number of installations than other 
sectors. Note the difference in axis scale between the two years.  
 
Clearly, some installations may have gained significant revenues from participating in the EU ETS, 
especially in the Ceramic sector where quite a few had permit profits above 5% of their operational 
revenues. However, these results should be viewed with caution in light of possible transaction cost 
burdens, since the Ceramic sector is characterized by a large number of small installations. Among the 
other sectors, Cogeneration was the biggest potential beneficiary, with quite a few installations earning a 
permit profit between 2 and 10% of revenues. It should also be noted that the proportion of benefits from 
permit sales was generally higher in 2005, despite the slightly worse volume positions of firms, shown in 
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Figure 4: Permit Sales (Purchases) as % of Operational Revenue (Cost)
14 
 






















































































Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and SABI data 
 
3.1 Thermoelectric Generation Sector 
 
The thermoelectric generation sector deserves a closer analysis because of the bigger effort required of it, 
the volume of emissions it produces, and also the variability of emissions it shows, depending on the 
weather patterns that affect hydroelectric production. In Figure 5 we show the 2005, 2006 and 2007 
balances of the thermoelectric sector, divided into the sub sectors of Fuel, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
(CCGT), Coal and Other (Biomass+Gasoil). 
 
In 2005, the only “long” facilities had been the ones using CCGT. In spite of this, the strong deficit shown 
by coal facilities meant that the sector as a whole presented a deficit. On the contrary, in 2006 this sector 
had a surplus even if coal facilities continued to show a negative balance, whereas all subsectors had 






                                                 
14 All installations with zero emissions were removed from the sample for this figure, as well as a few outliers (4 with 
strongly positive permit revenues in 2005 and 1 in 2006). Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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Figure 5: Thermoelectric Generation Balance 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from http://www.dgge.pt/ 
 
To understand what happened in the period, we need to look at weather factors. The deficit in 2005 can 
largely be explained by that year’s drought. It should be noted that renewable energy sources in Portugal, 
of which hydroelectric production is the largest by far (over 60% of installed capacity), normally account for 
a significant part of electricity consumption (between 20% and 40%). In 2005, that value was only 19,2%, 
with hydropower generation less than half its average value. 2006, on the other hand, was considered an 
average hydrological year, and hydro production was 124% higher than in 2005. In contrast, 2007 was 
drier but renewable energy production still increased by 2%, since the slight decrease in hydro was more 
than offset by the growth in wind power generation. Interestingly, the large sectoral emissions reduction 
between 2006 and 2007 (12% fewer emissions with only a 3,6% drop in electricity generation) cannot be 
fully explained by this factor, indicating that there were efficiency gains during the period.
 15 
  
We end this section by noting that wide variations in emissions (hence in permit transactions) should be 
expected for the power sector whenever renewable sources, especially hydroelectricity, face large 
variability. For example, Ellerman and Buchner (2007) note that emissions also fluctuate greatly in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, depending on hydroelectricity production in the two latter countries. The 
effect may or may not show up in the permit prices, depending on weather conditions throughout Europe. 
Although a couple of studies have looked at the effects of weather on permit prices (Mansanet-Bataller et 
al (2007), Alberola et al (2008)), they focus on temperatures, which only drive demand, and not 
precipitation, which may also affect supply. 
 
 
4. Regional effects of the European carbon market in Portugal 
 
Little attention has been paid to the possible impact of EU ETS in regional terms. However, installations 
are located in a physical territory, and the specialization of the different regions in the production of diverse 
goods and services can thus lead to dissimilar economic impacts of the carbon market from a regional 
                                                 
15 Data is from http://www.dgge.pt/ 
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point of view. Figure 6 shows the relative weight of each Portuguese region in the number of installations 
regulated by the EU ETS and population. 
 




































% Facilities % Population
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets (installations) and INE (population) 
See Appendix for full region names 
 
Generally, there is no proportionality between the share of each region in the national population and the 
share in the number of installations regulated by the EU ETS. For instance, there is one region, B-V, which 
holds 3,75% of the population and 20.5% of the installations, because in this region there are a large 
number of small installations; in particular, it has the majority of installations of the Portuguese ceramic 
sector. In the two major Portuguese cities, Grande Lisboa (GL) and Grande Porto (GP), as expected, the 
opposite happens: these regions represent 18.8% and 12.2% of the population, respectively, and have 
only 5.7% and 5.3% of the installations.  
 
We can also trace the relationship between CO2 emissions and some macroeconomic variables. Figure 7 
shows the regional share of allocated permits and national gross value added (GVA) in 2005 (the 2006 
data is similar). There are relevant asymmetries in the contribution of each region to both variables and, 
again, no clear correlation between them.  
 
There are regions whose relative level of emissions largely exceeds their contribution to the national GVA, 
such as Peninsula de Setúbal (PS), Médio Tejo (MT) and the most evident case, Alentejo Litoral (AL), 
which contributes with a 32,1% to national emissions and only 1.3% to the GVA. We can also see (and 
confirm with Table A1 in the Appendix) that 80% of the regulated emissions are made by 5 regions, which 
together represent 52% of national GVA. As in the sectoral analysis, there is a high concentration of 
regulated emissions in a limited number of regions.  
 
Clearly, the regional emission levels have a low correlation with GVA (the statistical correlation between 
variables is equal to 0.42, where the P-value is below 5%). 
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Source: Own elaboration using CO2 data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and GVA from INE.  
 
This feature can be confirmed by looking at per capita CO2 emissions (CO2pc) and per capita GVA 
(GVApc). Figure 8 shows that there is a weak correlation between GVApc and CO2pc (the equation in the 
figure is an OLS estimation). 
 
Figure 8. Per capita  GVA  (2005) and per capita CO2 regulated emissions 
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Source: Own elaboration using CO2 regulated emissions data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and GVA 
and population data in INE. 
 
To better understand the relationship between regional economic activity and CO2 emissions, it is 
important to remember that the levels of emissions and allocated permits vary between sectors. Recall 
that, as shown in Table 3, the largest emitter in the EU ETS is thermoelectric generation. Thus there is a 
significant correspondence between the regions with the highest level of emissions and the location of Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal  
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thermoelectric plants: Alentejo Litoral (AL), Grande Lisboa (GL), Península de Setúbal (PS), Médio Tejo 
(MT) and Grande Porto (GP). The high level of emissions in these regions is therefore related with this 
type of industry and not with general economic activity.  
 
We can now ascertain the direct impact of the EU ETS in regional accounts. In order to do so we have 
defined an effort index, consisting of the difference between the emission rights attributed to each region 
(on the basis of installation location) and the actual emissions for 2005 and 2006. A positive difference 
indicates that the sum of installations located in this region received more permits than they used. The 
eventual proceeds from selling the surplus may then contribute to increase the regional GVA. Likewise, a 
negative difference indicates that the installations located in this region had to buy permits and therefore 
transferred part of its GVA to other regions. Table 3 summarizes these effects. The last two columns 
shows the permit deficits (-) and surpluses (+) by region. The other columns illustrate the regional deficit or 
surplus by industry. Although regional GVA includes all economic activity that is physically in each area, it 
should be noted that not all impacts of an increase or decrease in profits due to EU ETS participation 
occur necessarily within the same region. In particular, many installations belong to national public 
companies, whose shareholders are spread among different regions. Nonetheless, we believe it is 
instructive to analyse the regional concentration of EU ETS direct impacts.  
 
As mentioned in section 2, even though the thermoelectric generation sector presented a deficit in 2005, if 
we consider 2005 and 2006 together, all sectors had a permit surplus.  Yet if we do the same analysis by 
regions, we see that some regions had a deficit and others a surplus, as shown in Figure 9. Particularly, 
Alentejo Litoral and Médio Tejo had important deficits (-25% and -10% of total permits, respectively) since 
the only two Portuguese thermoelectric installations still based on coal are sited there (Sines and Pêgo, 
respectively). Some other regions presented small deficits (a total of -5.5%) but most had a surplus. It is 
remarkable that the cities (GL and GP), as well as the next most heavily populated area (PS), had very 
large surpluses (27%, 34% and 41%, respectively). Thermoelectric installations in these regions had 
significant surpluses.  
 
Figure 9. Participation (%) of each region on the Portuguese balance of the EU ETS in 2005 and 2006. 
 
Source: own elaboration from Table 3. Table 3 - Deficit (-) or superavit (+) of emission rights in 2005 and 2006 (t CO2) 
 
Thermoelectric 








paper  Refineries Glass  Total  Total% 
Minho-Lima     15268    -141246       2508       -123.470 -2,84 
Cávado     13866       3085     6034       22.985 0,53 
Grande Porto  1291294 12780     70189 13230  45242 -313 56439 -471 1.488.390 34,19 
Alto-Trás-os-Montes     10148                      10.148 0,23 
Douro              -3828              -3.828 -0,09 
Ave           109669 72023              181.692 4,17 
Tâmega                             0 0,00 
Entre Douro e Vouga    8456    2851 13446     8479       33.232 0,76 
Baixo Vouga     194997    211110 33498     -294       439.311 10,09 
Baixo Mondego     37882 25266 168845       51758    6190 289.941 6,66 
Dão-Lafões  -436  1656    19088 9811     -1060       29.059 0,67 
Serra da Estrela                             0 0,00 
Beira Interior Norte                             0 0,00 
Cova da Beira     7603                      7.603 0,17 
Beira interior Sul                    -10047       -10.047 -0,23 
Pinhal Interior Norte     68904    18646       0       87.550 2,01 
Pinhal Interior Sul                             0 0,00 
Pinhal Litoral     71342 190650 54420       -397    67923 383.938 8,82 
Oeste     87665                      87.665 2,01 
Médio Tejo  -539452  38177    11910       25195       -464.170 -10,66 
Alto Alentejo           1837                1.837 0,04 
Alentejo Central                             0 0,00 
Lezíria do Tejo     25491 4075 26760 -6224     3537       53.639 1,23 
Grande Lisboa  1200505     -84500 19298 58552     4908    -7317 1.191.446 27,37 
Península de Setúbal 1173338  11169 269290 177416 48869  114780 8522       1.803.384 41,42 
 Alentejo Litoral  -1651747        103519          447905    -1.100.323 -25,27 
Baixo Alentejo     4271                      4.271 0,10 
Algarve  -8843  26046 21124                   38.327 0,88 
Região Aut. Madeira  -101788                          -101.788 -2,34 
Região Aut. Açores  -4279           7269              2.990 0,07 
Total 1358592  635721 425905 854312 249731  160022 98830 504344 66325 4.353.782 100,00 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets GEE 
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We can distinguish between the balance of thermoelectric generation and the balance of the remaining 
industrial sectors. In most regions, the latter had surpluses, as expected. Only the regions of Minho-Lima (M-
L), Douro (Do), Beira Interior Sul (BIS) and Grande Lisboa (GL) presented (fairly small) deficits in the 
remaining industries. 
 
As in section 2, to determine the economic impacts of the EU ETS on regions we will consider a price of 
21,73€ and 15,14€ per ton of CO2 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Globally, Portugal could have raised 
revenue of approximately 10 M€ and 58 M€ in those years, as noted earlier. Table 4 illustrates the regional 
significance of permit costs or benefits.  
 
Table 4. The potential regional costs of the EU ETS (values in thousand euros) 
 2005  2006   
Regions GVA  Permit 
Cost 
Cost as % 
GVA  GVA  Permit 
Cost 
Cost as % 
GVA 
Mean cost as 
% GVA 
Minho-Lima 1.894.649  1116 0,06% 1.957.013 1092 0,06% 0,06%
Grande Porto  15.445.710  -6896 -0,04% 16.203.435 -17730 -0,11%  -0,08%
Ave 4.708.421  -1911 -0,04% 4.792.371 -1419 -0,03%  -0,04%
Entre Douro e 
Vouga 2.817.126  -284 -0,01% 2.881.514 -305 -0,01%  -0,01%
Baixo Vouga  4.436.423  -4586 -0,10% 4.570.838 -3456 -0,08%  -0,09%
Baixo Mondego  4.202.096  -3189 -0,08% 4.342.376 -2168 -0,05%  -0,06%
Dão-Lafões 2.482.044  -336 -0,01% 2.552.784 -206 -0,01% -0,01%
Cova da Beira  751.569  -76 -0,01% 764.095 -62 -0,01%  -0,01%
Beira interior Sul  801.255  242 0,03% 828.595 -17 0,00%  0,01%
Pinhal Interior Norte  988.859  -1023 -0,10% 1.017.516 -613 -0,06%  -0,08%
Pinhal Litoral  3.190.054  -4596 -0,14% 3.301.249 -2611 -0,08%  -0,11%
Oeste 3.591.679  -938 -0,03% 3.721.239 -673 -0,02%  -0,02%
Médio Tejo  2.360.368  7481 0,32% 2.467.179 2086 0,08% 0,20%
Lezíria do Tejo  2.641.042  -216 -0,01% 2.705.965 -662 -0,02%  -0,02%
Grande Lisboa  40.759.069  -6336 -0,02% 41.845.049 -13624 -0,03%  -0,02%
Península de 
Setúbal  6.704.426 404 0,01% 7.072.951 -27584 -0,39%  -0,20%
Alentejo Litoral  1.683.540  10058 0,60% 1.788.151 9651 0,54% 0,57%
Região Autónoma 
Madeira  3.742.764 1109 0,03% 3.936.483 768 0,02% 0,02%
Portugal 128.362.921  -10402 -0,01% 133.055.128 -58398 -0,04% -0,03%
Source: Own elaboration; regions which have no installations, as well as regions where permits costs are below |0,01%| of 
GVA, are excluded from the Table. 
 
In the 5 regions that present costs (Minho-Lima (M-L), Beira Interior Sul (BIS), Médio Tejo (MT), Alentejo 
Litoral (AL) and Região Autónoma da Madeira (RAM)) these are not always very significant. The worst cases 
are Alentejo Litoral (AL) and Médio Tejo (MT) where the costs of the EU ETS reached on average 9,8 million 
and 4,8 million euros respectively (but note the large variation in the latter). The remaining regions present 
surpluses, the highest corresponding to the regions of Grande Porto (GP), Península de Setúbal (PS) and 
Grande Lisboa (GL), with average benefits of 13,6, 12,3 and 9,9 million euros respectively. However, if we 
analyze the costs and revenues as a percentage of GVA we see that they are generally not very significant. 
The top loser by far is Alentejo Litoral, where costs represent 0.57% of the GVA, whereas the top winner is 
now Península de Setúbal, with a 0,2% benefit, and the main cities’ gain is not so important (Grande Lisboa, 
for instance, gained only 0,02% of its GVA).  GEE 
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Since most of the emission reduction effort in Portugal is concentrated on the thermoelectric sector, there is in 
territorial terms a distortion on the energy-producing regions, which assume a disproportionate responsibility 
for emission control. On the other hand, the regions that do not produce energy have little responsibility for the 
reduction, although they contribute for the emissions through the consumption processes. Price pass-through, 
if allowed, could be a significant distributional factor, but so far that has not been the case, as noted in Section 
5.  
 
Figure 10 shows the different values for consumption and production of electricity at the regional level. Both 
the total production of electricity and the thermoelectric generation alone are shown. Five regions (PS, MT, 
Oe, GP and AL) represent 87% of Thermoelectric generation, 75% of electricity generation, and 29% of 
electricity consumption. Together they account for 80% of the CO2 regulated by the EU ETS and 41% of 
Portuguese population. The most unequal cases are Alentejo Litoral (AL), with 27% of the national thermal 
electricity generation and only 2.4% of electricity consumption, and Oeste (Oe), with 16% of thermal electricity 
generation and only 3% of consumption. On the other hand, we have the opposite situation in Grande Lisboa 
(GL), which has 18% of electricity consumption and only 0.9% of thermal production. 
 


















































































Source: Own elaboration using data available in Directorate-General for Geology and Energy (DGGE). 
 
 
5. The second Portuguese National Plan (2008-2012) 
 
Considering the results of the first trading period as well as the difficult path ahead to achieve the established 
legal targets, it is natural that the second Portuguese National Plan (for the period 2008 and 2012) (NAP II) 
would contain a permit reduction. Accordingly, the second Plan issued 152,552 million permits (CO2 
equivalent tons), implying an annual value of 30,510 Mt for the period 2008-2012, which is a decrease of 
about 17%.  
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Between the first and second NAP there was also a modification in the industries included in the emissions 
market, in accordance with new EC rules and some national modifications. For period 2008-2012 part of the 
ceramic industry is excluded, and units of cogeneration and combustion facilities of the chemical sector are 
included
16. Considering equivalent installations in both periods, the decrease in attributed permits is 22,4%. 
Table 5 shows the sectoral distribution of these reductions.  
 
Table 5– Comparison of permit attribution (Mt CO2) by sectors 
Sector /Subsector  NAP I  NAP II (without new 
entrants 2005/07)  NAP II vs NAP I 
Energy Supply  26,8  18,8  -29,7% 
        Production of electricity  21,0  13,5  -35,5% 
        Refineries  3,3  3,0  -6,7% 
        Cogeneration  2,5  2,2  -11,4% 
Industry 10,1  9,8  -3,3% 
        Cement and Lime  7,1  7,0  -1,4% 
        Ceramic  1,2  1,0  -15,8% 
        Glass  0,7  0,7  -2,6% 
        Pulp and Paper  0,4  0,3  -6,9% 
        Iron and Steel  0,3  0,3  8,4% 
        Other Combustion facilities  0,5  0,5  -6,5% 
Total for existing installations  36,9  28,6  -22,4% 
Reserve for new entrants  1,3     
TOTAL 38,2    
Source: PNALE II (2008) 
 
The electricity generation sector will once more have to make the largest reduction effort. This could 
strengthen the conclusions that we reached for the first plan, namely in terms of the higher damage 
concentration in the regions where these installations are located. The actual cost will depend on hydrological 
conditions. Moreover, it should also be mentioned that Portuguese electricity prices are mostly regulated and 
cannot be freely increased. As costs of providing electricity have increased (due to many factors, including the 
EU ETS), EDP, the main electricity provider, was by the end of 2008 burdened with a debt (the so called 
“défice tarifário”) of around 2 million euros, to be recovered from consumers, with interest, starting in 2010 
(Jornal de Negócios, 2008)
17.   
 
The following table is similar to Table 2, since it presents 2008 data for emissions, permits, and potential 
permit expenses. The only sector that was “short” was, again, thermoelectric generation, while the country’s 
ETS participation as a whole continues to show a surplus.    
 
                                                 
16 For more details see NAP II (PNALE II, 2008). 
17 The same problem with cost pass-through is noted for Spain, namely by Oberndorfer(2008), which points out that this 
may be one of the reasons stock-market values of electricity firms in that country are inversely correlated with permit prices, 
unlike in other countries. In energy markets without price regulation, on the other hand, results indicate high levels of pass-
through, leading to significant windfall profits from EU ETS participation for the power sector (Sijm et al, 2006).   GEE 
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Table 6 – Attributed permits, emissions (in Mt) and sectoral costs (in M€) for 2008 
 
      
Possible expenses in 
permit purchase 
Sectors  Emissions   Permits   Coverage %   at price 18,56 €/ton 
Thermoelectric generation  15,78  14,00  88,8  32,93 
Ceramic 0,27  0,57  211,2  -5,54 
Cement and lime  6,78  7,21  106,3  -7,91 
Cogeneration 2,53  3,47  136,9  -17,36 
Other Combustion Facilities   0,40  0,54  134,5  -2,56 
Iron and steel  0,20  0,34  164,2  -2,43 
Pulp and paper  0,34  0,39  113,6  -0,86 
Refineries 2,95  3,24  109,7  -5,30 
Glass 0,66  0,77  116,5  -2,02 
Total 29,91  30,51  102,0  -11,06 
 
 
6. Emission reduction policy analysis  
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse some policy options regarding emissions reductions from both a 
sectoral and a regional perspective. To this end it is important to look at all sectors, including those outside the 
EU ETS. Figure 11 contains the weight of each sector in emissions. The largest non-ETS sector is Transport, 
which accounted for 17% of emissions in 1990 and has since grown to 24%, although other non-ETS sectors 
are also significant. 
 
Figure 11: Sectoral CO2 emissions (%) in 1990 (inner) and 2007 (outer) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in EEA, http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/PivotApp/pivot.aspx?pivotid=475 
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A few European Directives have aimed at improving the performance of uncovered sectors, namely the 
European Energy Performance in Buildings Directive (EPBD), the Ecodesign Directive, the Biofuels Directive 
and the Energy Services Directive. Such measures have uncertain effects, however, and their costs cannot 
easily be calculated. Moreover, the inclusion of additional regulations such as these reduces flexibility and 
may increase compliance costs.  
 
A recent paper by Simões et al (2008) provides energy and environmental policy scenarios to gauge the 
impact of different policies on Portuguese CO2 marginal abatement costs. Theirs is a partial-equilibrium model 
of the Portuguese energy system which compares abatement costs for different hypothetical values of 
emission caps, to be achieved in the period 2020-2030.  The reference scenario is one where existing policies 
(such as the ban on nuclear power and the renewable energy goals) continue to be implemented. This 
scenario is compared to alternative scenarios where emissions reductions are achieved without some of the 
existing restrictions, ie, with more flexibility. The simulations indicate that the reference scenario has 42-91% 
higher marginal abatement costs than the scenarios where existing policy restrictions are dropped. It also 
implies that the full costs of the Portuguese energy system from 2000 to 2030 are 10-13% higher under the 
current policies than they could be if all reductions were allocated efficiently.  
 
Unfortunately, none of the Simões et al scenarios considers the possibility of emissions trading, as it does not 
alter abatement costs. However, it does change compliance costs, since high-cost users can purchase 
permits abroad instead of abating emissions, thus lowering national compliance expenses. Considering the 
global nature of GHG emissions, country-specific caps are only the starting point to emissions trading 
schemes and they need not be achieved rigidly. Thus, the authors’ estimated costs, assuming that specific 
emission targets have to be achieved within the national energy system, are higher than necessary.  
     
Considering all sectors of economic activity, we can trace the regional economic implications of the EU ETS 
more closely. Figure 12 shows the aggregate sectoral composition of GVA in Portuguese regions. The division 
used here considers three groups of sectors: I (agriculture, hunting and forestry, fisheries and aquiculture), II 
(industry including energy and construction) and III (services). There are no regional emissions data available 
to compare EU ETS regional emissions with total regional emissions. Nonetheless, sectors I and III are largely 
excluded from the emission cap regulations although they account for an important part of national emissions, 
as shown in Figure 11. Thus a regional analysis of the composition of economic activity can provide some 
additional insights on the relative imbalance between regional abatement efforts. Figure 12 shows, for 
instance, that sector III in Grande Lisboa (GL), Grande Porto (GP) and Península de Setúbal (PS), represents 
85%, 76% and 69% of economic activity, respectively. These are also the main population centers, which 
leads us to infer that these three regions could be the main emitters of GHG. Therefore, if sector III and 
households could be covered by the EU ETS or another emission reduction instrument, these regions could 
carry the highest burden instead of being the most benefited (as was the case in Table 4).  
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Source: Own elaboration using data available in INE 
 
The main conclusion is that the regional effects of the EU ETS during the period 2005-2007, which arise from 
the specific locations of the main industrial plants covered in the scheme, vary widely, not only because of the 
uneven stringency of permit allocation among covered sectors, but also because of the different productive 
specialization of Portuguese regions. The burden of reduction falls on regions which house EU ETS industrial 
activity, although these may not be the main GHG emitters.  
 
It is true that a system of emissions trading may be unsuitable for most of the uncovered sectors, because the 
transaction costs of registering and monitoring small emitters would be prohibitive. However, this does not 
wholly justify the current differentiation in treatment, because other economic instruments could be applicable 
to these diffuse sectors in order to internalize CO2 emission costs, like for instance environmental taxes. 
Theoretically, emission taxes would be capable of achieving targets in a cost-effective manner, by making 
sure marginal abatement costs are equal for all emitters. They do, nonetheless, impose much higher costs on 
emitters than grandfathered permits, which were chosen instead as a starting point in EU emission reduction 
efforts. If further reductions are to be accomplished, other sectors must be covered, preferably by measures 
that reach all of them equally. Hence the Senior European Commission official, Jos Delbeke, has announced 
that EU member states must look seriously at introducing carbon taxation to help cut greenhouse gas 
emissions; ‘the taxation debate is not running at EU level because we have chosen a market, but it can run at 
national level. Indeed it must, because the EU ETS is not going to do everything’
18. There has been an 
increased interest in taxation as an additional approach to cutting emissions in several countries
19. The 
superiority of green tax reforms for environmental protection (see Parry et al, 1999, or Aldy et al, 2009), joined 
                                                 
18 “Politics of Climate Change”, expert seminars organised by Policy Network at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science in the latter half of 2008. 
19 The 2009 UK Budget contains a limited environmental tax reform (shift of tax from goods to bads). Denmark has moved 
in the same direction after the collapse in global oil prices. Fuel taxes and other energy taxes will also be increased in 
Sweden to help reach its 40% emission reduction target (from 1990’S level) by 2020. A similar debate exists in Ireland 
(Callan et al., 2009).  GEE 
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with the fact that energy taxes in non-European countries are relatively low, makes them an attractive policy 
option outside Europe (Sterner, 2007).
20  Market-based climate policies have come increasingly under scrutiny 
around the world, especially after the 2008 presidential elections in the United States. Nonetheless, this wasn’t 
translated into firm commitments in the United Nations’ Copenhagen summit of December 2009, especially 
due to the objections of China. Climate legislation has meanwhile stalled in the US Senate and in other 
developed countries (the French government withdrew its proposed carbon tax in March 2010 and Australia 
shelved its plans for an emissions trading scheme in April 2010).    
 
In Portugal, the current recessionary period provides a difficult background for a discussion of new carbon 
taxes, in spite of their theoretical advantages. Nonetheless, existing fuel taxes could be further adjusted to 
reflect emissions in transport, and electricity prices should be allowed to gradually increase to reflect true 
power-generating costs. Some existing energy policies, such as a reduced VAT rate for energy or diesel fuel 
tax reductions, can be classified as environmentally harmful subsidies.
21 These should ideally be removed. 
Ad-hoc partial targets (such as those for renewable power generation), existing or future, should be evaluated 
taking into account EU ETS carbon prices, allowing their cost-effectiveness to be clearly assessed. This type 
of economic analysis was not performed to evaluate the National Program for Climate Change (PNAC)
22 nor 
is it performed in the recent National Action Plan for Renewable Energy (PNAER)
23, which lists a large 
number of policies, many of which are precisely ad-hoc targets. PNAER contains the mandatory estimates for 
quantitative policy impacts, but no cost assessment. Finally, our own results also indicate an additional 
problem that may come about due to strict renewable energy targets, namely because hydroelectricity (as well 
as, to a lesser extent, wind power) can show significant variability, so that reliance on such energy sources 
may bring large, and possibly undesirable, fluctuations in compliance costs. 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This work provided a first analysis of the consequences of the EU ETS at the sectoral and regional level for 
Portugal. We used data on allocated and verified emissions for all regulated installations for 2005 and 2006, 
as well as economic data (aggregated and firm-level) to provide context and relevance. 
 
A first set of conclusions deals with the pronounced inequality of the size distribution of Portuguese 
installations. Portuguese carbon emissions permits are extremely concentrated in a small number of 
installations. A second set of conclusions refers to the sectoral effects of the EU ETS. Only the thermoelectric 
plants showed a negative balance in the first phase, and only for year 2005. The results for this sector were 
shown to be highly dependent on weather conditions, namely precipitation, due to the necessity of replacing 
                                                 
20 In fact, this motivation might have inspired some recent bills: (i) the Canadian province of British Columbia introduced in 
2008 a new carbon tax coupled with reductions to income and business taxes; (ii) there is one proposal in the Major 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Bill in the US 110th Congress (December 3, 2008) for a green tax reform based on an economy 
wide tax on CO2 content of fossil fuels coupled with payroll tax rebates (see Aldy et al., 2009); (iii) the draft Energy Tax Bill 
in Taiwan during the year 2007 included alternative green tax reforms (Bor and Huang, 2009). 
21 Valsecchi et al (2009) define an environmentally harmful subsidy as: “A result of a government action that confers an 
advantage on consumers or producers, in order to supplement their income or lower their costs, but in doing so, 
discriminates against sound environmental practices.” 
22 http://www.apambiente.pt/politicasambiente/AlteracoesClimaticas/PNAC/Paginas/default.aspx 
23 PNAER, preliminary version for public consultation, available in http://www.dgge.pt/, June 2010 GEE 
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lost production from hydroelectricity. Still, most installations in all sectors gained from participating in the EU 
ETS, with sectors like ceramic and cogeneration receiving considerable additional revenues. 
 
A third set of conclusions deals with the regional impact. As expected, there is a high concentration of 
regulated emissions in a limited number of regions. Those that specialize on thermoelectricity (in particular, 
those that have coal based power production) suffered the greatest losses. Even so, these were never higher 
than 0.6% of regional GVA. 
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the transport sector, agriculture, households and other services are 
responsible for a large share of emissions but remain unregulated by the EU ETS.  Regions with the greatest 
share of the tertiary sector in their economic activity are thus benefited (especially because they can often 
have access to subsidies to improve energy efficiency) in detriment of regions where the activities of the 
secondary sector predominate, in particular the production of electricity.  
 
The policy implications raised in section 6 calls for a combination of cost-effective instruments: the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme could be complemented with other mechanisms through a hybrid regulation 
system, allowing for wide coverage of polluters with reasonable administrative and compliance costs (that is 
the case in many EU countries and there are several others seriously considering it). This might improve both 
efficiency and equity of the EU climate change policy, by ensuring that marginal abatement costs tend to 
equality (so that emissions abatement is done at minimum cost) and by sharing the burden more widely. Also, 
it could contribute to the new climate change policy agenda around the world both in developed and 
developing countries. 
 
Future research should focus on a regional-sectoral model of interaction, considering the key sectors, 
including EU ETS covered and uncovered sectors, or on the use of a General Equilibrium Model for the 
Portuguese economy that simulates alternative policies. Another important line of work is to provide 
econometric testing of the relationship between firm-level economic data and emissions (as is done for 
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Table A1: Regional CO2 regulated Emissions and VAB 
Portuguese Regions Nuts III 







Emissions % VAB % 
Minho-Lima  M-L  182013 0,5 1,5 
Cavado  Ca  28426 0,1 3,0 
Grande Porto  GP  3239134 9,3 12,0 
Alto-Trás-os-Montes  ATM  10936 0,0 1,4 
Douro  Do  3998 0,0 1,4 
Ave  Av  253848 0,7 3,7 
Tâmega  Ta  0 0,0 2,9 
Entre Douro e Vouga  EDV  74387 0,2 2,2 
Baixo Vouga  BV  590515 1,7 3,5 
Baixo Mondego  BM  2257925 6,5 3,3 
Dão-Lafões  D-L  76735 0,2 1,9 
Serra da Estrela  SE  0 0,0 0,3 
Beira Interior Norte  BIN  0 0,0 0,7 
Cova da Beira  CB  546 0,0 0,6 
Beira interior Sul  BIS  31220 0,1 0,6 
Pinhal Interior Norte  PIN  142624 0,4 0,8 
Pinhal Interior Sul  PIS  0 0,0 0,3 
Pinhal Litoral  PL  1792759 5,2 2,5 
Oeste  Oe  96261 0,3 2,8 
Médio Tejo  MT  4122429 11,9 1,8 
Alto Alentejo  AA  40307 0,1 1,0 
Alentejo Central  AC  0 0,0 1,4 
Lezíria do Tejo  LT  383273 1,1 2,1 
Grande Lisboa  GL  4796533 13,8 31,8 
Península de Setúbal  PS  4011021 11,6 5,2 
 Alentejo Litoral  AL  11131160 32,1 1,3 
Baixo Alentejo  BA  8191 0,0 1,0 
Algarve  Al  517755 1,5 4,1 
Região Autónoma da Madeira  RAM  458295 1,3 2,9 
Região Autónoma dos Açores  RAA  463588 1,3 2,0 
Portugal 34713872 100,0 100,00 
Source: Own elaboration using data from INE. 
CO2 Emissions and VAB of 2005 
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VAB per capita 
2005 in 
thousand euros  
Regulated 
Emissions per 
VAB (ton CO2 per 
M€)  
Minho-Lima 722,0 8,7 82,7 
Cávado 70,0 10,8 6,5 
Grande Porto  2541,7 14,1 180,5 
Alto-Trás-os-Montes 49,8 9,6 5,2 
Douro 18,5 9,4 2,0 
Ave 487,6 10,5 46,4 
Tâmega 0,0 7,8 0,0 
Entre Douro e Vouga  261,3 11,5 22,7 
Baixo Vouga  1493,1 13,0 114,6 
Baixo Mondego  6720,0 14,5 462,5 
Dão-Lafões 264,1 9,9 26,6 
Serra da Estrela  0,0 8,5 0,0 
Beira Interior Norte  0,0 9,8 0,0 
Cova da Beira  5,9 9,5 0,6 
Beira interior Sul  413,0 12,3 33,5 
Pinhal Interior Norte  1035,0 8,3 124,1 
Pinhal Interior Sul  0,0 9,6 0,0 
Pinhal Litoral  6821,8 14,1 483,7 
Oeste 271,4 11,8 23,1 
Médio Tejo  17861,5 11,9 1503,4 
Alto Alentejo  333,1 12,1 27,5 
Alentejo Central  0,0 12,0 0,0 
Lezíria do Tejo  1549,8 12,4 125,0 
Grande Lisboa  2388,4 23,6 101,3 
Península de Setúbal  5266,6 10,2 515,0 
 Alentejo Litoral  114283,0 20,1 5693,7 
Baixo Alentejo  63,0 11,6 5,4 
Algarve 1250,0 14,9 83,9 
Região Autónoma da 
Madeira  1872,9 17,8 105,4 
Região Autónoma dos 
Açores 1918,0 12,5 153,6 
Portugal  3290,6 14,1 233,1 
Source: Own elaboration using data from INE. 
 